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Abstract
Unrecognized states are characterized by stagnant or crumbling economies and political
instability, often serve as havens for illicit trade, and challenge the territorial sovereignty
of recognized states. Their persistence is both intellectually puzzling and normatively
problematic, but unrecognized statehood can be a remarkably stable outcome, persisting for decades. Our four-player model reveals that unrecognized statehood emerges as
an equilibrium outcome when a patron state is willing and able to persistently invest
resources to sustain it. We assess options available to actors in the international community who seek to impose their preferred outcomes in these disputes and find that,
although sanctions are the most frequently employed, they can often lead to renewed
conflict instead of the intended resolution.
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Introduction

South Ossetia is an archetypical unrecognized state – characteristic of those regions of the
world in which non-state actors control territory and govern populations. From 1990 to
1992, Ossetian rebels fought a successful secessionist civil war against the Georgian government that ended with a ceasefire and left the rebels in de facto control of much of the
region of South Ossetia, which sits along Georgia’s northern border with Russia. In the 22
years since the ceasefire was signed, South Ossetia has functioned as an unrecognized state,
governing its own affairs but unrecognized by foreign nations.1 The Georgian government
maintains its claim to the territory of South Ossetia, while the South Ossetians continue
to seek international recognition of their independence. In 2004, the Georgian government
began intermittent efforts to close trade with the separatist region, and in 2008, following
escalating provocations from the Ossetian side, Georgia attempted to reclaim the territory
by military force. Russian troops acting in support of the Ossetians quickly crushed the
would-be reconquest, and the status quo was restored.
The international system is characterized by a norm under which seceding entities are
rarely recognized by foreign states unless they are first recognized by the home state.2 This
norm makes sense in a context where almost all states have reason to fear the emergence of
secessionist movements within their own borders, and a state system that places seceding
entities at an extreme disadvantage lowers the expected benefits of secession, thereby reducing the incentives for secessionist movements.3 Thus, unrecognized states emerge when
seceding entities gain de facto territorial control through successful wars of secession, but
are not militarily strong enough to force recognition of their independence from the home
state from which they have seceded.
Persistent unrecognized statehood is both intellectually puzzling and normatively unde1 South

Ossetia, along with Abkhazia, was recognized by Russia and Nicaragua in 2008, Venezuela and
Nauru in 2009, and Tuvalu in 2011.
2 This norm is not absolute: in some cases, like the People’s Republic of China, the sovereignty of the home
state government (over Taiwan) has never been recognized by some states. In other cases, like Kosovo, the
commission of mass atrocities by the home state government may supersede its sovereignty.
3 Coggins (2011: 451) notes that, "The more acute the domestic threat, the more the reticence to recognize."
For the definitive international legal treatment of recognition, see Crawford (2006).
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sirable. It is an extremely costly outcome for the secessionists, the home states from which
they are attempting to secede, and the international community more broadly. Nonetheless,
unrecognized statehood has been a recurring phenomenon since WWII, with half a dozen
current unrecognized states having existed for more than 20 years.4 Much of the existing
literature treats unrecognized statehood as either a transient phenomenon or simply as a
failure to reach recognized statehood. In contrast, we argue that unrecognized statehood
is an important outcome in its own right, and one that is potentially extremely stable over
time. A major contribution of this paper is the demonstration of unrecognized statehood as
a long-run equilibrium outcome of the strategic interaction between not just the secessionists and the home government, but also the international community and states or non-state
actors who act as patrons of the secessionists. We show that unrecognized statehood can be
a stable outcome despite its persistently high costs to all actors involved.
The costs to the secessionists are arguably the highest. Non-recognition locks unrecognized states out of a states-only club whose members enjoy benefits in terms of both
security and economic integration. Unrecognized states do not benefit from the norm of
territorial integrity that reduces the cost of territorial defense by increasing the chance that
foreign powers will intervene against, or at least sanction, an invader.5 Non-recognition also
prevents entry into multilateral and bilateral trade agreements, dramatically reduces access
to foreign aid, and excludes their territory from international legal frameworks, making it
harder to secure foreign investment (Milhalkanian 2004; Caspersen 2013: 40-45).6
The home state bears costs of non-settlement as well, although they are not as high as
those facing the unrecognized state. Instability in the border region and the diversion of
military resources to monitor the de facto border are costly, as is maintenance of economic
sanctions against the unrecognized state. In Azerbaijan, where an oil boom sent GDP
4 Abkhazia,

Ngorno-Karabakh, Transnistria, Somaliland, South Ossetia, and the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus.
5 See Zacher (2001) on the norm of territorial integrity.
6 Transnistria represents a case where the gains from smuggling, particularly for the elite, may have outweighed these other economic costs in the 1990s (King 2001). However, as Moldova deepens ties with the EU,
Transnistria’s lack of access to EU markets and EU aid becomes a much larger relative cost to bear (Tudoroiu
2011).
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soaring in the mid-2000s, the unresolved secessionist conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh led a
massive military buildup to take precedence over other government spending.7 Foreign
investors are more wary of investing in states that do not effectively control their own territory, and there are diplomatic costs as well. For Georgia, failure to resolve its outstanding
secessionist conflicts has hindered progress toward NATO accession.
The purpose of this paper is to identify the mechanisms that sustain unrecognized statehood as a stable equilibrium and to evaluate potential strategies through which actors may
preserve the stability of this equilibrium, or disrupt it by inducing war or negotiated settlement. While there are many game theoretic treatments of civil conflict, we believe ours is
the first formal model in which unrecognized statehood is addressed as an outcome.
We develop a novel, four-player model that focuses on the core conflict between the
home state and the secessionist elite, but also incorporates the actions of outside states with
interests in the outcome. These outside actors are a patron, which prefers independence
to reunification, and a fourth player we denote as player c who represents one or more
members of the international community. Player c is assumed to prefer reunification to
independence.
The game is infinitely repeated and proceeds as follows. At the beginning of each
period, the payoffs for the secessionists from unrecognized statehood—to which we refer
as the status quo—deteriorate by a fixed amount, representing the ongoing costs of nonrecognition. Next, the patron and international community can, in turn, make investments
to augment the payoffs of the home state government and the secessionists. Finally, the
home government and secessionists play a simultaneous stage game in which each decides
whether to initiate conflict, maintain the status quo of unrecognized statehood, or cede the
issue of status.
We provide a set of conditions under which perpetual unrecognized statehood is the
outcome of a subgame-perfect equilibrium of this game. Somewhat counterintuitively, in
this equilibrium a patron will expend resources every period if necessary to sustain the
7 Military

spending increased 51% in 2004-2005, and went up another 82% in 2006 (International Crisis Group

2007)
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status quo of unrecognized statehood even when the patron would prefer that the secessionists achieve recognized independence. This occurs when the international community’s
preferences against recognition are sufficiently strong—as is almost always likely to the
case—to make it prohibitively expensive for the patron to facilitate recognition in the face
of counteractivity by the international community.
In the end, the status quo outcome is observed when the patron—who faces a much
tighter budget constraint—outspends an international community with access to a much
larger pool of resources. This occurs because each outside actor’s willingness to pay to
achieve its most preferred outcome is outstripped by the other’s desire to avoid its least
desired outcome. We are left with an unresolved conflict with no clear winner, and even if
there is no official loser, all parties pay significant costs.
We go on to analyze a tool that has been one of the most frequently employed by the
international community in these types of territorial disputes: economic and military sanctions. We show that, although the goal of such sanctions is presumably to encourage secessionists to cede the issue of status, their most pronounced effect is to increase the range of
conditions under which war occurs. In contrast, we argue that members of the international
community (player c) are capable of intervening through other means to overcome the influence of the patron and induce settlement if they are sufficiently motivated to do so. Policy
options include the enforcement of bargains and the granting of positive inducements for
settlement, rather than direct pressure on the unrecognized state via sanctions.

1.1

The Empirical Landscape

The contributions of this paper are primarily theoretical, but it is useful to introduce the
empirical landscape that informs our model. Table 1 catalogs the post-WWII cases of unrecognized statehood, separated according to their current status. We define unrecognized
states as territories in which a non-state actor controls territory, governs a population, and
seeks but does not receive broad recognition as an independent state.8 All six current un8 This

excludes, for example, the territories governed by FARC in Colombia because FARC does not seek
recognized statehood and includes cases, like South Ossetia, where recognition is obtained by only a handful
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recognized states have now been unrecognized for over twenty years.

Table 1: Current Status of Militarily Successful Secessions
Unrecognized States
(Recognized by fewer
than 10 UN members)

•
•
•
•
•
•

Abkhazia
Nagorno-Karabakh
Somaliland
South Ossetia
Transnistria
Turkish Republic of
Northern Cyprus

Partially recognized states
(Recognized by more than
10 members, but not the
home state)1

Rejoined home state
following military defeat of
secessionists

• Kosovo
• Taiwan
• Palestine2

•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Anjouan2
Biafra
Chechnya
Croatian Republic of
Herzeg-Bosnia
East Turkestan
Republic
Hyderabad
Katanga
Republic of Mahabad
Tamil Eelam
Republika Srpska
Republika SrpskaKrajina
Western Bosnia
Western Sahara3

Rejoined home
state in negotiated
settlement

Recognized by
the home state

Ajara
Bouganville
Gagauzia
Moheli

• Bangladesh
• Eritrea
• South Sudan

•
•
•
•

1 Palestine is recognized by about 100 states, but has only permanent observer status at the UN, the same status
accorded the Vatican.
2 Anjouan separated from the Comoros on two occasions: first in 1997 and again in 2007. The first separation ended in
negotiated settlement. The latter separation lasted less than a year and ended in military defeat of the secessionists.
3 All but a tiny portion of the territory claimed by the Polisario Front is under the control of Morocco: nonetheless, some
states still recognize the territory’s independence.

Of those cases in the table, all but Moheli controlled territory and govern(ed) populations for at least two years. These cases represent the most successful cases of attempted
secession in the Post-WWII era, and yet eventual military defeat by the home state is still the
modal form of resolution. Recognition by the home state is similarly rare, occurring in only
three cases and never except as a direct result of concessions won on the battlefield. In cases
where recognition by the home state or the right to a referendum on independence is not
secured as part of the initial peace agreement, it has not historically been forthcoming. Only
four cases of negotiated reunification are observed: secessionists who are strong enough to
of other states. We also exclude entities, like the Slovak Republic, whose secession was not opposed by the state
from which it seceded. We acknowledge that other scholars might differ with us with regard to the inclusion
or exclusion of specific cases. We assert that our model is a useful tool for analyzing each of the cases in this
table; it may be useful in explaining some of the ambiguous cases we exclude as well.

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1
2

!!
!!
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secure and retain territorial control are rarely willing to surrender their independence at
the bargaining table, even though the chances of eventual recognition are vanishingly slim.
Thus, the number of long-running, costly stalemates has been substantial, most of them
eventually ending in military reconquest by the home state.

1.2

Unrecognized States in the Literature

The political science literature on civil war is focused primarily on war onset, war intensity
and duration, and the durability of post-conflict peace. Unrecognized statehood does not
fit neatly into these areas of study because, while unrecognized states begin, and often end,
through violent conflict, periods of unrecognized statehood generally contain little, if any,
fighting. Unrecognized states also fall outside most treatments of state formation, because
most unrecognized states never achieve recognition (or have not achieved it yet).9
The first literature to address unrecognized states directly was grounded in comparative
politics, and a robust area-studies literature exists around each of the current cases of unrecognized statehood.10 More recent literature has addressed wider ranges of cases and made
important conceptual progress identifying patterns and commonalities across cases (e.g.
Pegg 1998; Kolstø 2006; Geldenhuys 2009; Caspersen and Stansfield 2011; Caspersen 2013).
However, the literature continues to lack a clear general theory specifying the conditions
under which this outcome emerges and persists.
One of the major contributions of this article is to provide a unified analytic framework
for understanding the mechanisms sustaining unrecognized statehood as a stable equilibrium. By modeling unrecognized statehood formally, we move away from a case-by-case
treatment toward development of a rigorous general theory. The model allows us to assess
the conditions under which unrecognized statehood persists, and those under which war
and negotiated settlement occur. It also allows us to evaluate various strategies available
9 For

example, Roeder (2007) treats unrecognized states simply as failures to gain recognized statehood, not
as outcomes to be analyzed in their own right.
10 Lynch (2004), King (2001), Stanislawski (2008), and Bakke et al. (2013) provide notable treatments of the
Former Soviet cases, and a pair of edited volumes by Bahcheli, Bartmann, and Srebrnik (2004) and Kingston
and Spears (2004) each compile broader sets of case studies.
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to actors, particularly states and coalitions of states who want to facilitate a peaceful and
permanent resolution.
Although we are not aware of any formal models of unrecognized statehood there is
a growing economics literature that employs game theoretic models of conflict. An early
model of territorial disputes in which the divisibility of the contested territory is an important parameter is Grossman (2004). In Hirschleifer, Boldrin and Levin (2009), conflict can be
avoided when there is common knowledge, a common rate of time preference, and players
can make a series of small concessions. In our context, the contested territory is indivisible;
this implies that peace would require very large concessions so that this pathway of using
small compromises to avoid conflict is not available.
In contrast to Bueno de Mesquita (2013), which exemplifies a class of literature that examines how rebel groups make decisions about resistance strategies, we begin our analysis
at the point where initial rebellion has already been successful to the point of gaining de
facto control of the disputed territory.
Another strand of the literature explicitly models the bargaining process between potential adversaries, either with asymmetric (Yared 2010) or complete information (Jackson
and Morelli 2007, Schwartz and Sonin 2008, Beviá and Corchón 2010, McBride and Skaperdas 2014). Acemoglu, Golosov, Tsyvinski and Yared (2012) develop a dynamic model of
resource wars featuring limited commitment. We abstract from questions of resource allocation and bargaining in order to focus on the dynamics created by the involvement of
outside players: in the case of unrecognized states, the international community and patron
states.
We next turn to presenting the model. In Section 3, we present a set of conditions under
which unrecognized statehood is a stable, long-run equilibrium outcome. In Section 4,
we analyze the potential effects of sanctions on the resolution of territorial disputes while
Section 5 explores extensions of the model. Section 6 evaluates policy implications of the
model, assessing various strategies available to outside actors that seek to induce their
preferred outcomes. Section 7 concludes.
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2

A Model of Unrecognized Statehood

We model a dispute over a piece of territory that is controlled by a secessionist group and
also claimed by a home state. The central issue of contention, independence vs. reunification, is both difficult to divide and highly valued by both sides. The secessionists seek
recognized statehood, the home state seeks reunification, and these demands do not vary
over time. The side payments that can be offered in exchange for the opponent’s surrender of the independence/reunification issue are sharply limited by the absence of large
concessions that can credibly be made (Walter 1997, 2002; Schultz 2010).
A major innovation of our model is the introduction of international actors. While the
role of outside actors in determining the duration and outcome of civil conflicts is well
documented (e.g., Elbadawi and Sambanis 2000; Regan 2002; Balch-Lindsay, Enterline, and
Joyce 2008), the role of these actors has not been incorporated into the modeling of these
conflicts.11 This is true even of work that addresses the role of outside actors as potential
third-party enforcers (Walter 1997, 2002).
The model presented here allows us to both articulate the mechanisms that create these
persistent stalemates and to assess the consequences, intended and otherwise, of outside
actors’ attempts to foster their desired outcome.12

2.1

The Players

We construct a model with four players: the secessionist elite (s); the central government of
the home state (g) from which s is attempting to secede; and two other players, the patron
(p) and the international community (c). The latter two are outside actors—states, groups
of states and/or individuals acting in concert—that have interests in the outcome of the
attempted secession.
Player c prefers reunification to recognized independence—a preference that is common
11 One

exception is van Houten (1998), who models the patron state ("reference state”) as a player in ethnic
conflicts but otherwise takes an approach quite different from ours.
12 For another example of the strategic manipulation of decision-makers into (and out of) conflict see Baliga
and Sjostrom (2012).
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to most states, and especially among those that fear the prospect of secessionist movements
within their own borders. As discussed earlier, most states in the international system
prefer any given secessionist conflict to be resolved by reunification. In practice we believe
that in most cases there are many states that may act as player c in our model, and often we
observe groups of states like the OECD or the UN acting in this capacity.
Player p most prefers recognized independence, aligning its interests with the secessionists. We refer to p as the patron because p contributes resources to the unrecognized state in
the status quo equilibrium. Patrons choose to contribute resources to secessionists for one
or more of several reasons: 1) As an efficient mechanism for imposing costs on the home
state (Salehyan, Gleditsch and Cunningham 2012), e.g. as Russia does to Georgia via South
Ossetia and Abkhazia; 2) ethnic solidarity with the secessionists (e.g. Turkey’s support of
the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus); 3) hope of eventual annexation of the disputed
territory (e.g. Armenia’s support of Nagorno-Karabakh).13
We acknowledge that there may exist patrons whose most-preferred outcome is the status quo. This naturally makes a status quo equilibrium easier to achieve, as there is an
actor who strictly prefers the status quo and can expend resources to make it more likely.
We choose to examine the case where the patron’s most preferred outcome is independence because this is the condition under which the status quo is least likely. Even in this
circumstance, the status quo remains an equilibrium outcome.

2.2

Timing and Structure of Interaction

The game begins at a status quo in which the secessionist elite controls at least some of the
disputed territory, but cannot gain international recognition unless the central government
cedes its claim to the territory. This condition is archetypical of cases in which a militarily
successful war of secession ends in a ceasefire.
13 While annexation is appealing to many patrons (and some unrecognized states), annexation is not an outcome we model. International norms against irredentism are strong, and the costs of annexing an unrecognized
state appear to be prohibitively large in most cases (e.g. Zacher 2001). Prior to Russia’s annexation of Crimea, all
post-WWII cases of annexation involved the annexation of colonial territory, rather than parts of the metropole.
Israel’s occupation of the Golan Heights and the West Bank are possible exceptions here.
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Figure 1: Timeline

The payoff functions and all parameters, including probabilities in the war lottery, are
common knowledge for all players, and actions are immediately observed by all players
at the time they occur. There are an infinite number of periods n = 1, 2, . . ., with play
proceeding until an absorbing state is reached.
Future payoffs are discounted with parameters δi , where 1/δi is player i’s discount rate
for i ∈ ( g, s, c, p), 0 ≤ δi ≤ 1. Therefore payoffs for the entire game for player i ∈ {s, g, p, c}
n −1
can be expressed by the discounted stream of payments Σ∞
.
n=1 Uin δi

In each period, play proceeds as follows:
1. The status quo payoffs for s are reduced by µ.
2. p chooses a level of resource expenditure R pn ∈ R+ in period n and invests it to alter
the payoffs of players s and/or g.
3. c chooses a level of resource expenditure Rcn ∈ R+ in period n and invests it to alter
the payoffs of players s and/or g.
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4. s and g play a stage game in which each chooses simultaneously from the following
actions: {Fight, Status Quo, Cede}.
In order to fully describe the structure of the game, we first introduce the stage game
payoffs.

2.2.1

Stage Game Payoffs

Stage game payoffs for players s and g in period n, gross of investments by players p and c,
are:
g ↓, s →

Fight

Status Quo

Cede

Fight

Ωn

Ωn

Wgn , Lsn

Status Quo

Ωn

Q gn , Qsn

Wgn , Lsn

Cede

L gn , Wsn

L gn , Wsn

Q gn , Qsn

Figure 2: Stage Game Payoffs
If either s or g plays Cede while the other plays Fight or Status Quo, the game enters an
absorbing state (i.e. the game ends), with payoffs in every subsequent period given by the
corresponding entry in the stage game (Figure 2). We interpret one player ceding as that
player ceding the issue of status (independence vs. reunification) in exchange for some set
of (relatively small) payments from the opposing player. For example, if the secessionists
cede, the secessionist region is reunified with the home state and the payoffs are Ls for the
secessionists and Wg for the home state. Therefore, if one player agrees to cede while the
other player chooses to remain in the status quo or fight, the result is a negotiated settlement
benefiting the player who did not cede.
If both states simultaneously play Cede, we assume that both renege immediately and
that the status quo is preserved for that period. In this case neither player has demonstrated
a willingness to give up more than the other. Therefore, payoffs for both players ceding
simultaneously are identical to the status quo payoffs.
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There are three ways to end up in war: either of the parties may attack first, or both
may attack simultaneously. We denote the payoffs of war as a lottery Ω.14 This lottery
determines one of three potential outcomes: outright victory by either of the players, which
are both absorbing states, and an indecisive war where costs of war are borne but then the
game returns to the status quo in which the game continues to the next period. Outright
victory would, among other things, allow an unrecognized state to force recognition by the
home state government. Therefore, outright victory requires more than simply securing
control of the disputed territory (which the secessionists have already done when the game
begins) and requires the ability to impose the terms of settlement. In practice, this likely
involves the capture of the home state capital and/or the overthrow of the home state
government.
For probabilities p1 of outright victory, p2 of loss and 1 − p1 − p2 of non-decisive war,
player i ∈ {s, g} in period n with a fixed cost of war ζ i faces war lottery ωin ≡ ( p1 (Win −
ζ i ), p2 ( Lin − ζ i ), (1 − p1 − p2 )( Qin − ζ i )). Ωn ≡ (ω gn , ωsn ).15 Players are assumed to approach war lotteries as expected values.
If both s and g play Status Quo, then the status quo persists. The status quo payoffs
for the secessionists are modeled as steadily declining due to the costs of non-recognition
discussed in the introduction. As the economy in the secessionist region deteriorates, so
does the standard of living for the secessionists. Therefore, the payoffs from the status
quo, in the absence of other actions, are given by qs,n+1 = Qs,n − µ. Lower case letters
denote beginning-of-period quantities net of investments by outside actors, while upper
case letters denote end-of-period quantities gross of such investments. Other payoffs remain
unchanged from period to period; they can only be altered by the investments of players p
or c, e.g. Ls,n = ls,n + R p,n + Rc,n and ls,n+1 = Ls,n , likewise for player g and for the payoffs
from winning for both players and the status quo for player g.
14 Because the unrecognized state already controls territory and the de facto borders are armed, there is likely
only a small advantage to be gained by attacking first for either side. Therefore, we argue it is not essential to
differentiate between these war scenarios analytically.
15 Baseline costs of war are fixed (ζ ) but additional costs of war based on war’s result are captured in W and
i
i
Li .
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2.2.2

Payoffs for the Patron and International Community

At the start of each period, the patron, p, and player c may invest resources to affect the
payoffs of s and g in the stage game. For example, if p expends resources R pn to increase the
secessionists status quo payoffs, the beginning-of-period payoff qsn becomes end-of-period
payoff Qsn = qsn + R pn . We can write analogous expressions for q gn , lsn , l gn , wsn , and wsn ,
and the international community can also make investments to increase whichever of these
payoffs they like. B pn denotes the total that the patron can devote to interceding in the
conflict; we assume that player c, which is often a large coalition of states, does not have a
binding budget constraint.
We assume player c prefers peace to war. For simplicity, we limit our modeling of c’s
preference for peace to the assumption that c will not choose to fund a military buildup
that it expects will induce war. This assumption is not necessary for the basic results to
hold; however, it justifies our decision not to address military support of armed reconquest
by the home state as a deliberate strategy by c to achieve reunification.
We use two binary variables to express the preferences among the three outcomes (status
quo, reunification, recognition by the home state) for both p and c. X is a binary variable
representing reunification: X = 0 in the status quo and X = 1 if the secessionists rejoin the
home state. Y represents recognition by the home state of the secessionists’ independence:
Y = 1 if the home state recognizes the secessionists as independent, Y = 0 otherwise.
Player p’s payoffs in period n are U pn = αX + λY − R pn , while the payoffs for player c
are Ucn = βX + νY − Rcn , with both payoffs denoted in currency units.
The patron opposes reunification while player c prefers it, so α is negative and β is
positive. The patron prefers recognized independence so λ is positive. Player c is averse to
the creation of new states so ν is negative.
The relative strengths of the patron and player c’s preferences determine their willingness to spend resources. As we will show, unrecognized statehood emerges as an unhappy
but stable middle ground in which all players avoid their least preferred outcomes.

13

2.2.3

The Low Payoffs from Ceding

Aside from the central assumption that the government of the home state most prefers reunification and the secessionists most prefer independence accompanied by international
recognition, we will for the most part leave the model general enough to incorporate a
range of preferences and capabilities for players g and s. We do, however, assert that the
payoffs for the party that cedes the issue of status (independence vs. reunification) are
consistently low. This reflects a combination of two factors. First, the issue of status is indivisible16 and highly valued by each side, making its surrender undesirable. Various forms
of ethno-nationalism often motivate secession, and the values attached to independence by
secessionists (and to reunification by citizens of the home state) are generally large relative
to the values placed on economic prosperity and other goals. Second, many of the payments
that could be offered are not credible (e.g. Schultz 2010).
The difficulty of making credible payments in exchange for status is one clearly demonstrated in the civil war literature (e.g. Licklider 1995; Walter 1997, 2002; Fearon and Laitin
2007; Doyle and Sambanis 2006). Unrecognized states generally constitute “sons of the soil"
conflicts in which the central government cannot credibly commit to preserving the local
demographic and political dominance of the secessionist elite once the disputed territory
reverts to central government control (Weimer 1978; Fearon 2004). While the central government might initially grant the secessionist elite a high level of autonomy in exchange
for agreeing to reunification, the level of autonomy is likely to decrease over time, perhaps
quite quickly. The payments that can be offered by the unrecognized state to the central
government are similarly small or unenforceable: once recognition is achieved, the secessionists have little reason to uphold any prior commitments.
The case of Gagauzia illustrates the commitment problem nicely. Gagauzia achieved de
facto independence at the time of the Soviet Union’s collapse, but agreed to rejoin Moldova
in 1994 as an autonomous region. While Gagauzia was granted substantial autonomy under
the Moldovan Law on the Special Legal Status of Gagauzia, when the governor of Gagauzia,
16 Either

the unrecognized state has sovereignty over its territory and is co-equal with the home state, or the
secessionist region (and its government) are subordinate to the central government.
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Dmitrii Croiter, moved to assert these powers in 1999, the Moldovan government balked.
By 2002, Croiter was forced to resign, effectively deposed by the Moldovan government.
The Moldovan government jailed a number of other Gagauz politicians, and while de jure
Gagauz autonomy was enshrined in the Moldovan constitution in 2003, the de facto level
of autonomy has been limited by continued central government meddling in less-than-free
regional elections. The payoffs to Gagauzia for ceding have turned out to be quite low, and
a similar fate can rationally be expected by other unrecognized states who choose to cede.

3

Explaining Outcomes of Secessionist Conflicts

Despite the preferences of the international community for peace, the most common outcome of secessionist conflicts in the post-WWII period has been reunification with the home
state via outright military reconquest. By contrast, reunification through negotiated settlement has been very rare. We will explore potential explanations for this seeming inability
of the international community to achieve its aims in Sections ?? and ??. First, we turn to
the outcome that we find the most puzzling: perpetual unrecognized statehood.

3.1

Analysis of the “Status Quo” Equilibrium

Unrecognized states are frequently viewed as temporary phenomena or as non-equilibrium
outcomes attributable to players’ misperceptions of the strategic situation, or their fundamental irrationality. Our central result shows that unrecognized statehood can be an
equilibrium outcome capable of being sustained in perpetuity by fully rational, perfectly
informed actors. This is true even when there is no actor that prefers unrecognized statehood as a first-best outcome.
Proposition 1: There exists an equilibrium in which the outcome is perpetual unrecognized statehood. The actions in this equilibrium are for p to invest to create a buffer of
β
1−δc

between the payoffs from ceding and the status quo in the first period and to invest

up to µ each period thereafter to maintain the buffer; for c to pay nothing; and for both
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g and s to play Status Quo each period.
The following are sufficient conditions for such an equilibrium:
1. For both players g and s, Qin ≥ Lin ∀n: in each period, remaining in the status
quo is better than ceding.
2. For both players g and s,

Qin
1−δi

≥ −ζ i +

Lin ( p2 )+Win ( p1 )+ Qin (1− p1 − p2 )
1−δi

∀n: in each

period, the expected outcome under war is worse than the status quo.
3.

−α
1− δ p

β
1−δc :

≥

reunification is more important for the patron to avoid than for the

international community to achieve.
4.

−ν· p1s
1−δc

≥

λ· p1s +µ
1− δ p

+ 1−βδc : recognition of the secessionist state is more important for

the international community to avoid than for the patron to achieve.
5. B p1 ≥

β
1−δc

− (qs1 − ls1 ): the patron can afford to deter player c from inducing

reunification at the beginning of the game.
6. B pn ≥ µ, ∀n > 1: the patron can afford to pay to maintain the status quo.17
These conditions for the status quo are sufficient but not necessary. For example, if the
status quo initially has a much higher long term payoff than the next best alternative for
the secessionists, Condition (6) need not be met to maintain the status quo in the short run.
The inequality will bind for some set of periods n ≥ 1 because the secessionist payoffs from
the status quo decrease over time. In cases where condition (6) is not met, we can have
unrecognized statehood for some time, but it is not a long-run equilibrium outcome.
There are many other potential equilibrium outcomes of this game, including, under
the right parameters, immediate ceding by either party as well as fighting (see Section ??).
As we are interested particularly in the outcome of long-term unrecognized statehood, here
we focus on the question of the existence of an equilibrium that leads to this outcome in
perpetuity. We will use the solution concept of subgame perfect equilibrium to show that,
17 Depending on parameters, condition (5) is more likely to be binding than condition (6). If there is great
variance in budget between periods for the patron, such as a greatly reduced budget in some period n > 1
compared to period 1, (6) could be binding.
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given the sufficient conditions in Proposition 1, at least one status quo equilibrium will exist.

Proof of Proposition 1
Recall that each period is composed of three action stages: player p’s investment decision
(stage 1), player c’s investment decision (stage 2), and the simultaneous game between
players g and s (stage 3). Although period n may be reached because in period n − 1
fighting resulted in a stalemate, both players ceded, or the status quo had been maintained,
the strategic landscape in period n is the same. Thus all periods in which the players are
able to move are in an equivalence class in which the only possible strategic difference is in
the value of the state variables.
Analysis of the posited equilibrium proceeds most naturally by backward induction
within each period. Thus we begin with the stage game between the government and
secessionists.
Lemma 1: Conditions 1 and 2 are sufficient for status quo to be the outcome of Stage 3
in any period.
The proofs of the lemmas are in the Appendix.
Lemma 1 establishes ranges for the payoffs for players g and s—gross of investments
by the outside players—in which the status quo outcome can occur. The rest of this section
tackles the more difficult task of determining the incentives and actions of the outside
actors—that is, the patron state and the international community—to impact those payoffs.
To begin, note that either outside actor could invest toward increasing any of the six
state variables in a period: qsn , q gn , wsn , w gn , lsn , and l gn .18 It is not necessary to focus on
which investment vehicle is optimal for a government to choose; what is essential is to
determine which outcomes—i.e. Recognition, Status Quo, or Reunification—they will target
given that they will choose the most efficient way to alter the payoffs of players s and g.
18 In

the case of wsn and w gn , it is more intuitive to imagine investments increasing the probability of winning
a war; because the lottery is additively separable and the “Win” outcome is always preferred when it occurs
independently in the stage game, this more convenient modeling choice is inconsequential.
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Lemma 2 addresses potential efforts by the international community to influence the
outcome toward Reunification:
Lemma 2: When Condition 3 holds, the patron’s willingness to invest to maintain
the status quo is sufficient to deter the international community from intervening to
encourage reunification.
Condition 3 provides a bound on the amount that player p must be willing to invest each
period in order to prevent player c from contesting the status quo outcome. To complete
the equilibrium construction, we must determine the utility maximizing investments by p
and conditions to ensure that it is able to make those investments.19
Consider period 1. When Condition (4) holds, the patron will want to invest just enough
to create a buffer of

β
1−δc

in equilibrium, R p1 =

between Qs1 (= qs1 + Rs1 ) and ls1 so that c will not invest. That is,

β
1−δc

− (qs1 − ls1 ) as long as p can afford to make this investment. Thus

we need Condition (5): B p1 ≥

β
1−δc

− (qs1 − ls1 ), where B p1 is the amount p has available to

spend on the conflict in period 1.
In periods n > 1, there are two cases to consider. Either (a) the buffer created in period
n − 1 was precisely the necessary

β
1−δc ,

or (b) the buffer is larger than

β
1−δc .

In case (a),

the patron must spend exactly µ to offset the degradation in the status quo payoffs and
re-establish the buffer of

β 20
1−δc .

In case (b), the patron can spend less than µ in period n.

However, because in each period qsn degrades by µ, eventually the buffer will be reached
and we will be returned to case (a). Again, assuming Condition (3) holds, the patron will
want to make this investment if its budget allows, and so a sufficient condition is that p’s
budget is at least as large as µ in every period n > 1(Condition 6).
With the equilibrium status quo investments determined, we can proceed to Lemma 3,
which rules out spending for or against recognition of the secessionist state:
Lemma 3: When Condition 4 holds, the international community’s willingness to in19 Efforts by the patron to create the conditions for the Recognition outcome are addressed in Lemma 3 once
the equilibrium investments are established.
20 A third case in which the buffer is smaller than β provides lower welfare to player p. Conditions (3) and
1−δc
(5) ensure that player p can avoid this case.
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vest to avoid recognition of the secessionist state is sufficient to deter the patron from
investing to achieve recognition.
In the equilibrium under consideration here, the patron will invest to maintain an outcome that is not its most preferred, but it will not invest to achieve its most preferred outcome. This behavior may appear counterintuitive, but we frequently observe patron states
whose preferred outcomes are recognized independence for the secessionists who nonetheless contribute resources to sustain a status-quo outcome that is costly to all involved. The
patron does not attempt to contribute sufficient resources to force recognition by the home
state because doing so would induce offsetting expenditures by the international community to prevent this outcome.21
One last possibility is ruled out by Lemma 4: that the patron would invest to encourage
the secessionists to fight.
Lemma 4: Conditions 3 and 4 ensure that the international community’s willingness
to invest to discourage new conflict is sufficient to deter the patron from investing to
instigate such fighting.
Note that this result depends on an implicit assumption that the patron is not able to
skew the odds of the secessionists winning the conflict in a way that cannot be nullified by
the international community. All other conflict scenarios are ruled out by the international
community’s assumed preference to avoid conflict.
Thus, given Conditions (1)-(6) hold, equilibrium strategies for each period in this status
quo equilibrium are:
• Player p spends more than c is willing to invest to ensure the incentives for the status
quo outcome are in place in period n whenever this is affordable. That is, p invests
o
n
β
R pn = max 0, 1−δc − (qsn − lsn ) ≤ B pn . If this inequality is violated, p invests nothing.
21 We

do not provide conditions on the budget of player c similar to Conditions (5) and (6): since the size
of the international community relative to any particular country is large, it can be assumed that a budget
constraint does not bind.
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• Player c invests Rcn =

β
1−δc

− ( Qsn − lsn ) if

β
1−δc

> ( Qsn − lsn ). Otherwise, it invests

nothing.
• Players s and g play Status Quo as long as it yields the highest continuation value,
and play Cede or Fight if continuation values from either exceeds the status quo
continuation value.
Equilibrium actions are for p to maintain the status quo by investing µ each period
once the difference in payoffs to s from playing Status Quo and Cede reaches

β
1−δc

(with a

possible lump sum investment at n = 1 of up to that amount); for c to not invest and for
both g and s to play Status Quo each period.



By contributing µ in each period, the patron supplies sufficient resources to the unrecognized state to ensure that the secessionist elite prefers the status quo to surrendering
independence.

3.2

Discussion

The existence and durability of this not-infrequently observed status quo equilibrium is
counterintuitive on two levels. First, the large, relatively rich international community is
outspent by a relatively small, less-resourced patron; second, unrecognized statehood is a
stable equilibrium in spite of being undesirable to all players. The key condition leading
to this outcome is that each outside actor’s willingness to pay to achieve its most preferred
outcome is outweighed by the other’s desire to avoid it’s least desired outcome. An ongoing
unresolved conflict results.
Despite its high costs, this equilibrium is quite robust. Because player c and the patron
can adjust contributions to reflect changing conditions on the ground, exogenous shocks
that might otherwise have the potential to alter the equilibrium have their strategic impact
nullified. For example, while a drought in the unrecognized state might decrease the secessionist elite’s payoffs from the status quo and increase their need for international trade and
assistance, additional humanitarian and economic assistance from the patron can offset the
effects of the shock and preserve the status quo. Likewise, if the home state gains military
20

strength, altering the probabilities in the war lottery, the patron can offset these changes
by providing arms or otherwise investing in the defenses of the unrecognized state. See
further discussion along these lines in Section ??.

3.3

Alternative Outcomes

The conditions of Proposition 1 do not provide for a unique equilibrium, or even a unique
equilibrium outcome. In fact, at least one additional equilibrium outcome always coexists
with the status quo outcome.
If the payoffs from Fight are strictly greater than the payoffs from Cede for both players,
then (Fight,Fight) will be the only additional equilibrium outcome. If this inequality holds
for just one player, then we have only the additional outcome in which that player chooses
Fight and its opponent cedes. If both players strictly prefer Cede to Fight, then both the
(Fight, Cede) and (Cede,Fight) outcomes are added to the status quo outcome.22
There are at least two takeaways from the multiplicity of equilibrium outcomes. First,
it indicates that there may be an important role for external actors to play in coordinating
expectations about which equilibrium will be played, and in the absence of such coordination, equilibrium switching from the status quo equilibrium to one of the other outcomes is
possible. Second, most of the types of outcomes that we observe in the post-WWII era are
consistent with the set of parameters outlined in Proposition 1 that support the status quo
outcome. In the next section, we turn to the use of sanctions by player c and the home state
to attempt to force reunification.

4

The Impact of Economic Sanctions

In Section ??, we considered the outside actors’ abilities to make investments to increase the
various payoffs of the home state government and the secessionists. The international community, in particular, often employs another option by joining the home state in enforcing
22 In

the case of any indifference, we get the relevant combination of (Fight, Fight), (Fight,Cede) and (Cede,

Fight).

21

economic sanctions against the unrecognized state, an action that reduces the secessionists’
payoffs from the status quo (i.e. sanctions are equivalent to Rcn < 0). Note that this may be
particularly effective if c is a large coalition of states acting in concert.
Let us begin with the simplest case, in which the sanctions affect only the secessionists’ status quo payoffs, as when the imposition of sanctions has a negative impact on the
economy of the unrecognized state. In the event that the secessionists cede or are defeated
militarily, we presume the sanctions would be immediately lifted – the home state would
not want to sanction itself. In the event the secessionists achieve military victory, we presume they are able to force the home state to lift the sanctions.23 Sanctions are not expected
to affect the payoffs to either ceding or military victory and neither should the cost of
fighting itself be negatively impacted.
Thus, sanctions serve only two purposes: to narrow the difference between the payoffs
from Status Quo and Fight, and to narrow the difference between the payoffs from Status
Quo and Cede. If the patron wishes to maintain the status quo, its per-period investment
must increase to compensate for the additional degradation of the status quo payoffs caused
by the sanctions. All of this implies that the effect of sanctions on the unrecognized state’s
choice is not unambiguous. Proposition 2 lists necessary conditions for the existence of an
equilibrium in which “ceding” is the equilibrium outcome once sanctions are introduced.
Proposition 2: Assume the conditions of Proposition 1 hold in the absence of sanctions
and that sanctions affect only player s’s payoffs to maintaining the Status Quo. In order
for sanctions to lead to ceding by the secessionists, the following are required:
1. The patron must either be unable or find that it is not worthwhile to invest the
additional amount now required to maintain the status quo.
2. The patron must either be unable or find that it is not worthwhile to invest to
instigate fighting by the secessionists.
3. The continuation value from playing Status Quo must fall below that from playing
Cede before it falls below that from playing Fight.
23 Recall

that our definition of military victory includes the ability to dictate the terms of settlement.
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The proof of Proposition 2 is in the Appendix.
If condition (1) fails, player p will continue to invest to prevent reunification as in
Proposition 1. If conditions (2) or (3) fail, sanctions will lead to fighting initiated by the
secessionists—either supported by the patron, or without its support in the case of condition 3. Note here from condition (2) that sanctions can induce investment behavior by the
patron that was ruled out under the conditions of Proposition 1: the goal of sanctions is to
destabilize the Status Quo equilibrium and they certainly can achieve that goal but there
may be unintended consequences, most notably the initiation of war by the secessionists.
Thus, even if we do not consider the sanctions to impose any direct costs on the home
state (though in practice they likely do), it remains ambiguous whether sanctions will benefit the home state. Recall that in the status quo equilibrium, the home state’s expected
returns from war are lower than from a continuation of the status quo. If sanctions induce
the secessionists to play Fight, this is a worse outcome for the home state than if the status
quo had been allowed to persist.
Moving beyond this simple case, we can add realism by allowing sanctions to have a
negative effect not only on the economy (the status quo payoffs) but also on the military
capabilities of the secessionists (the expected payoffs from war). This is an important extension because one motivation for sanctions is often precisely that – to weaken the military
capability of the secessionists.
In the model, this is represented as reducing (increasing) the secessionists’ probability
of victory (loss) in the war lottery. This should serve to increase the range of parameters
over which the conditions of Proposition 2 hold. However, at the same time, the home
government experiences changes of the same magnitude and opposite sign in its war lottery, increasing its payoffs from playing Fight. The effect of sanctions on the home state’s
strategic considerations is clear cut:
Proposition 3: Assume the conditions of Proposition 1 hold in the absence of sanctions
and that sanctions affect both player s’s status quo payoffs and its military capabilities.
The parameter space over which a war will be initiated by the home state is increasing
23

in the magnitude of the sanctions’ impact on the secessionists’ military capabilities.
The proof of Proposition 3 is immediate. Although under the conditions of Proposition
1 the home state’s continuation value from maintaining the status quo is higher than from
initiating conflict in the absence of sanctions, when those sanctions degrade the secessionists’ military capabilities they increase the chances that the home state would prevail in
a conflict, thus increasing the home government’s continuation value from fighting. The
stronger is the impact of sanctions on the secessionists military, the stronger is the effect on
the home government’s value of fighting and the greater is the range of parameters over
which this change in payoffs will lead to a change in behavior.
Thus, propositions 2 and 3 imply that sanctions are both wealth destroying and violence
increasing. The sanctions destroy wealth directly by damaging the economy of the secessionist region and lowering the secessionists’ payoffs from the status quo. If the degradation
of status quo payoffs are not offset by the patron and if the secessionists’ continuation value
from fighting exceeds that from the status quo before the continuation value from ceding
does, the secessionists will initiate war. Conversely, if the sanctions degrade the secessionists military capabilities sufficiently, it induces the home state to fight.
This logic is well illustrated by the case of Tamil Eelam, a territory in Northern Sri
Lanka that existed as an unrecognized state from 1987-2009. Throughout the conflict, the
Sri Lankan government used sanctions and blockades to reduce the secessionists’ status quo
payoffs and degrade their military capabilities. However, the effects of these sanctions were
offset by two patrons: India, during the early stages of the conflict, and the Tamil diaspora
throughout. The disruption of the status quo equilibrium began in 2006, when the United
States, European Union, Canada, and India formally designated the leading secessionist
organization, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), as terrorists.24 This designation
greatly strengthened the sanctions against the secessionists and led to a sharp decline in
both the quality of life in Tamil Eelam and the military capabilities of the LTTE. In January
2008, the Sri Lankan government abrogated the existing ceasefire agreement and in 2009
24 Other

states then followed suit, including Australia in 2008.
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it launched a full-scale military offensive that ended with a decisive victory over the LTTE
and reunification of Tamil Eelam and Sri Lanka. While there were many factors at play,
the strengthening of sanctions increased the home state’s probability of victory and thereby
played a role in its decision to initiate a return to war.
Despite this potential for perverse effects, sanctions are a common tool of outside actors
(c), more common than aid and other positive inducements. A flow payment of carrots,
even backed by the promises of a “neutral" third party, may not be credible in the eyes of
the secessionists, which could explain the frequent resort to sticks.

5
5.1

Extensions
Introducing Uncertainty

The assumption of perfect information may be somewhat unrealistic, and here we explore
adjusting the model to accommodate some uncertainty on the part of c and p. Payoffs as
described in the stage game are those perceived by g and s. If these payoff values are not
precisely known by c and p, enough uncertainty may be present in order for both those
players to contribute resources in equilibrium.
Here, c and p observe a random draw of the stage game payoffs, with each payoff drawn
independently and with a mean matching the original stage game payoffs. After viewing
these (uncertain) payoffs, c and p each invest some level of resources, altering the payoff
structure before it is observed (accurately) by s and g. Based on this altered payoff structure,
c and g choose their strategies. Uncertainty can lead to outcomes where either c or p invests
too much, wastes resources, or makes a more severe misstep, such as p investing too little
and allowing reunification to occur.
In practice we expect that uncertainty is lower for the patron than for c because the
patron is close to, and intimately involved in, the conflict and therefore may have a better
grasp of the two players’ payoffs than do other outside states or groups. This makes overcontribution by c more likely than under-contribution by the patron.
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In the equilibria constructed in Section ??, full information on all sides implies that one
of the parties would, in equilibrium, not give any resources. By adding some uncertainty
about payoffs, we can account for the observed fact that c sometimes expends resources
unsuccessfully. This type of spending can also be explained as non-strategic spending – i.e.
spending aimed at goals other than promoting settlement, like pure humanitarianism.

5.2

Outside Interactions Between the Patron and c

The game that we model, with the control of the unrecognized state at stake, is only one of
several strategic games in which the patron and c may be interacting at any given time, and
linkages between games are possible. We do not model any direct exchange of resources or
imposition of harm between c and the patron, but we take the implications of these possible
outside interactions seriously. The willingness and ability of either party to contribute
resources within the game we model may be affected by their interaction with one another
in other contexts. As we will discuss in greater detail below, in a number of cases a patron
has withdrawn support for an unrecognized state in response to pressure exerted by actors
in the international community (c) in other venues.

5.3

If the Patron Withdraws Support

Support by a foreign patron is, in almost all cases, necessary for the persistence of unrecognized statehood (Kolstø 2006; Caspersen 2013). When there is no patron, or when the
patron withdraws its support, military reconquest by the home state is likely. The only
unrecognized state currently in existence which has been able to survive without a patron
is Somaliland. Somaliland has been able to survive as long as it has because of the extreme
weakness of the home state (Somalia).
The case of Chechnya is quite typical of unrecognized states without patrons. Chechnya
fought and won its initial war of secession at a time when the home state (Russia) was in
political and economic disarray following the collapse of the Soviet Union. As Russia gradually recovered and strengthened, Chechnya had no patron support to offset the relative
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decline in its military capabilities. Over time the war lottery became progressively more
skewed in favor of Russian victory, the payoffs to ceding for the Chechen secessionists remained extremely low, and the Russian government invaded and reconquered Chechnya in
1999.
It is worth exploring, however, the reasons why a patron might support a secessionist group during its initial rebellion and then withdraw support at a later date. Patrons’
strategic interests in the unrecognized state vary from patron to patron, and both budget
constraints and salience of interest vary over time. Returning to the case of Tamil Eelam,
domestic political concerns (primarily Tamil ethnic solidarity) induced a modest level of
Indian support for the secessionists from 1983-1987. These domestic political concerns were
eventually outweighed by broader strategic security concerns and a desire for regional stability. In 1987 the Indian government signed a peace accord with Sri Lanka (the home state)
and largely withdrew their support from the secessionists.
As noted in the section on outside interactions between the patron and player c, the
patron’s decision to withdraw support for the secessionists is sometimes motivated by interactions between the patron and c that we do not model directly. Empirically, we observe
a number of cases in which c applies pressure directly to encourage the patron to withdraw
support from the unrecognized state. In an extreme example involving both sanctions and
direct military confrontation, NATO coerced Serbia into, among other things, withdrawing
its support from Republika Srpska and Republika Srpska Krajina, both of which were then
reconquered militarily.25

6

Policy Implications: Options for Player c

Sanctions imposed by the home state, often co-enforced by player c, aim to disrupt the status
quo equilibrium and force the secessionists to cede. However, as Section ?? demonstrates,
sanctions also increase the risk of war, something player c prefers to avoid.
Fortunately, there is a better way. If instead of enforcing sanctions, player c tries to
25 For

an excellent discussion of the case of Republika Srpska, see Zahar 2004.
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promote settlement by supplementing the payoffs from unification, it is able to induce
negotiated settlement without simultaneously increasing the risk of war. This can be done
either through promises of benefits to the unrecognized state provided directly by c, like aid,
or by a commitment from c to serve as a third-party guarantor of side payments promised
by the ceding side: both directly increase Li with the goal of raising it above Qi for the player
who will cede in the settlement. In the case of contingent promises of aid, the calculation is
relatively straightforward: 1) the promise of aid must be credibly contingent on negotiated
settlement, and 2) the aid offered must be valued more highly than the concessions required
to reach an agreement. It is the second condition that is most problematic. Because both
sides place such a high value on status (independence vs. reunification), even large amounts
of aid are likely to be valued less than the concessions necessary to reach an agreement.
Serving as a third-party guarantor of autonomy rights is a way for player c to potentially
overcome problems of indivisibility and commitment and help the parties reach a credible
compromise on status (Walter 2002). However, this strategy is only tenable when the only
impediment to settlement is the unenforceability of a bargain, and when c is credible as an
enforcer of that bargain.
In Southern Sudan, third-party actors, including the UN, invested substantial resources
to help negotiate a settlement to the initial war of secession and to ensure that the Sudanese
government both allowed the promised referendum and respected its results. While the UN
and others invested resources in Southern Sudan to enforce independence, not autonomy,
they have demonstrated that outside actors are capable of enforcing difficult concessions by
the home state government. This bodes well for the future credibility of organizations like
the UN as third-party enforcers. However, the role of outside actors in enforcing other past
agreements might give secessionists pause. For example, a referendum on independence
in Western Sahara, which the UN ruled to be necessary more than thirty years ago, has
never come to pass.26 Nonetheless, it is possible for an outside state or coalition to invest
resources to enforce agreements, allowing for negotiated settlements that would otherwise
26 For

a thorough analysis of the Western Sahara case, see Zunes and Mundy (2010).
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be impossible to reach.
To show that it is possible for an actor like player c to enforce the terms of negotiated
agreements at a reasonable cost is not sufficient to imply that such an outcome is likely.
The political will necessary to achieve success in Southern Sudan was motivated largely
by the magnitude of the atrocities that accompanied the war of secession, and enforcement
was made credible, in part, due to the weakness of Sudan relative to the outside states
involved. Enforcing the terms of an agreement between Georgia, South Ossetia, and Russia,
for example, would be more difficult.
It is also possible for actors like c to affect the payoffs of the patron through interactions
in other games outside of our model. Such actions would manifest themselves within the
model as reductions in the patron’s willingness to pay to sustain the status quo. If the patron
is unwilling to pay to sustain the status quo, the status quo payoffs of the secessionists will
decline over time, eventually leading to either war or negotiated settlement. Under these
conditions, the within-game costs to c of inducing negotiated reunification also fall.
In this section we have argued that outside states are capable of imposing their preferred
outcome, including peaceful reunification. The key, however, is motivation: actors like
player c are capable of inducing peaceful reunification when they are willing to invest the
resources necessary. However, strong preferences of secessionists against reunification and
the opposing intervention of the patron make the costs of such interventions prohibitively
high in most cases. Unrecognized statehood is a stable equilibrium because, while there are
many actors in the international community that share the preferences we ascribe to c, they
are usually unwilling to invest sufficient resources to outspend the patron and induce their
preferred outcome.

7

Conclusions

In this paper we establish unrecognized states as an outcome of interest for social scientists
and provide a unified framework for analyzing that outcome and its alternatives. Current
events, particularly, Russia’s military and economic support of secessionist rebels in East29

ern Ukraine, suggest that the phenomenon of unrecognized statehood will not fade from
relevance soon. While the Ukrainian situation remains fluid, the status quo equilibrium we
model is a plausible future. The equilibrium could emerge as follows: with Russian support, the secessionists solidify de facto control of parts of Eastern Ukraine, but risk of direct
confrontation with the West is sufficiently high to prevent Russian annexation of Eastern
Ukraine.27 Further Russian economic aid keeps the status quo payoffs of the secessionists
sufficiently high that they decline negotiated reunification. If necessary, contributions to
the home state by U.S. and the EU (player c) strengthen the home state enough to prevent
the secessionists from overthrowing the Ukrainian government and forcing recognition. In
twenty years, Eastern Ukraine may look a good deal like South Ossetia does today.
While the importance of outside actors in civil conflict has been widely acknowledged
in the empirical literature, it is rarely modeled formally. We introduce a unique four-player
model that captures the core strategic interactions of the secessionist elite and the home
state central government, as well as the interventions of outside actors with interests in the
outcome. This allows us both to examine the means through which patron states sustain
unrecognized statehood as a stable equilibrium, and to rigorously analyze the strategies
available to other outside actors to pursue reunification. It is not always in the interests
of outside states to bear the costs of inducing their preferred outcome, but we identify the
mechanisms through which this is possible and the thresholds that must be overcome.
In the model we present, we show that unrecognized statehood can emerge as an equilibrium outcome even when it is a terrible outcome for all players involved. The patron,
even when it prefers outright independence, is willing to bear costs in every period to uphold an outcome that is far short of its ideal, and which imposes high costs on others as
well. The international community, though wealthier than the patron, does does not outspend the patron to force reunification because the patron’s desire to avoid reunification is
stronger than the international community’s desire to achieve it.
By providing economic and other aid to the unrecognized state, the patron keeps the
27 Annexation

of Crimea was achieved at a reasonable cost to Russia. The costs of annexation Eastern Ukraine
would likely be substantially higher.
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secessionist elite’s payoffs from the status quo high enough to prevent a negotiated reunification. The stability of this equilibrium is abetted by the indivisible nature of independence
and the difficulty of enforcing autonomy as a condition of reunification. In cases where
there is no patron or where the patron eventually becomes unwilling to continue its support, the result has almost always been violent reconquest by the home state.
Our model also suggests, however, that the historical pattern of costly stalemate followed by violent resolution is not the only possible path. We show that the stabilizing
effect of the patron can be overcome by a sufficiently motivated international community.
While the most frequently employed means through which outside actors attempt to induce
settlement—sanctions—also increases the risk of war, we show that it is possible for outside
actors to induce their preferred outcome without running this risk. In particular, we suggest that they can provide positive inducements for settlement and serve as a third-party
guarantor of negotiated settlements in which unrecognized states rejoin the home state as
autonomous regions. It is often not the lack of available means that prevents outside actors
from inducing their preferred outcome, but rather the lack of will.
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A

Appendix

Proof of Lemma 1
Recall that the upper case notation represents payoffs gross of investments by the outside
players. Without loss of generality, consider the incentives to deviate for player s in period
n given that the other three players play their equilibrium actions. Given the stationary
equilibrium actions, playing Status Quo will lead to Qsn ∀n, so the continuation value is
Qsn
.
(1−δs )

Player s’s continuation value from the one-shot deviation to Cede, which leads to

an absorbing state with payoff Lsn in each period, is

Lsn
.
(1−δi )

The one-shot deviation to fight

results in the war lottery, with a cost of −ζ s , Ws forever with probability p1 , Ls forever with
probability p2 , and the status quo payoff forever with probability 1 − p1 − p2 . Thus the
continuation value is ζ s +

Wsn ( p1 )+ Lsn ( p2 )+ Qsn (1− p1 − p2 )
.
1−δi

In order for player s to play Status Quo, it must be that the continuation value from
Status Quo is higher than both that from playing Cede (Condition 1) and Fight (Condition
2). The argument for player g is symmetric.



Proof of Lemma 2
SQ
SQ
SQ
Again, in the status quo, we have U pn
= − RSQ
p and Ucn = − Rc . If the outcome is reuni-

fication, payoffs in this absorbing state in the period in which the investment is made are
RU = α − R RU and U RU = β − R RU where SQ and RU distinguish investments under the
U pn
p
cn
c

status quo and reunification scenarios respectively.
Thus the difference in continuation values from switching from the status quo to reunification for player p is

α+ RSQ
p
1− δ p

− R RU
p . For player c it is

β+ RSQ
c
1−δc

− RcRU . Neither player will be

willing to invest in its least preferred state. That is, R RU
= RcREC = 0. So c is willing to
p
β+ RSQ

invest up to 1−δcc toward reunification—or preventing the status quo—and p is willing to
−(α+ RSQ
p )
invest 1−δp
each period toward maintaining it.
Player c would be able to deter player p from investing to maintain the status quo—e.g.
counter an addition to qsn with an investment to lsn —as long as RcRU =
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β+ RSQ
c
1−δc

≥ Qsn − lsn ,

where Qsn is gross of any investment by p.28 That is, the required investment must be no
more than the gain player c receives from investing.
Given our assumption that the status quo outcome is no worse than the reunification
outcome net of investments for player s, when

−α− RSQ
p
1− δ p

>

β+ RSQ
c
1−δc ,

p is willing to invest enough

to create a large enough difference in Qsn − lsn so that player c will not find contesting the
status quo to be in its interest. Whenever the status quo will be the outcome in this way,
c maximizes its utility by choice of RSQ
= 0. Given that RSQ
c
p is non-negative, a sufficient
condition to prevent c from inducing the reunification outcome is

−α
1− δ p

>

β
1−δc .



Proof of Lemma 3
SQ
SQ
SQ
In the status quo, we have U pn
= − RSQ
p and Ucn = − Rc . If the outcome is recognition of
REC = λ − R REC and
the secessionists, per-period payoffs in this absorbing state become U pn
p
REC = ν − R REC where SQ and REC distinguish investments under the status quo and
Ucn
c

recognition scenarios respectively.
Thus the difference in continuation values from switching from the status quo to recognition for player p is

λ+ RSQ
p
1− δ p

− R REC
. For player c it is
p

ν+ RSQ
c
1−δc

− RcREC . As noted above,

RcREC = 0. So c is willing to invest up to −ν per period toward maintaining the status quo,
and p is willing to invest up to

λ+ RSQ
p
1− δ p

toward recognition. We have shown that the largest

possible investments by p in the status quo are
so the largest this difference can be for p is

β
1−δc

λ+µ
1− δ p

+

in n = 1 and µ in each period thereafter,
β
1−δc .

Player c would be willing to counter whatever investment player p makes to try to
induce recognition—e.g. counter an addition to l gn with an investment to q gn —as long
as −ν ≥ L gn − q gn , where L gn is gross of any investment by p.29 That is, the required
investment must be no more than the loss player c receives from investing.
Given our assumption that the status quo outcome is no worse than the recognition
outcome net of investments for player g, p’s willingness to invest up to

λ+µ
1− δ p

+

β
1−δc

can

28 Here we have assumed that the payoff relationship at n is such that ceding is better than fighting. If this
relationship is reversed, similar analysis and results hold.
29 As in the proof of Lemma 2, we have assumed that the payoff relationship at n is such that ceding is better
than fighting. If this relationship is reversed, similar analysis and results hold.
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create a difference of at most that amount in L gn − q gn .
Thus

−ν
1−δc

>

λ+µ
1− δ p

+

β
1−δc

guarantees that player c will always be willing to counter an

investment by player p toward achieving recognition, making p unwilling to make that investment in the initial stage and making the response by player c unnecessary. A slightly
weaker version of this inequality is stated as condition 4 so that this deterrence dynamic is
guaranteed to operate through the war lottery as well, as will be seen in Lemma 4.



Proof of Lemma 4
The difference in continuation values from switching from the status quo to taking the war
lottery for player p is

λp1 +αp2
1− δ p

WAR . For player c it is
+ RSQ
p − Rp

noted above, RSQ
= 0. So c is willing to invest up to
c

νp1 + βp2
1−δc

νp1 + βp2
1−δc

WAR . As
+ RSQ
c − Rc

toward preventing fighting if

this quantity is negative (leave the case where it is non-negative until later).
p is willing to invest up to

λp1 +αp2
1− δ p

+ RSQ
p toward instigating fighting when this quantity

is positive, and will not invest when the quantity is non-positive. Thus we must only
examine the case where this quantity is positive.
We will again set RSQ
p at its largest value of
this only case of interest, we have

αp2
1− δ p

+

λp1
1− δ p

µ
1− δ p

+

µ
1− δ p

+

− β· p2s
1−δc

≥

+

β
1−δc

β
1−δc

as this is most restrictive. In

> 0. Note that the first term is

negative while the rest are positive.
Multiplying Condition 3 by − p2s , we have

α· p2s
1− δ p .

Using this with Condition 4,

we have

−



νp1s + βp2s
1−δc



1s
= − 1νp
−δc −

βp2s
1−δc

≥

αp2s
1− δ p

+

λp1s
1− δ p

+

µ
1− δ p

+

β
1−δc

> 0 ∀ p1s , p2s

Hence when player p’s gain from instigating war is positive, player c’s loss is negative
and larger in absolute magnitude. Player c will thus counter any such investment by player
p, deterring the investment in the first place.



Proof of Proposition 2
Suppose that sanctions are applied by player c in period n + 1 after a Status Quo equilib38

rium such as the one supported by the construction in Proposition 1 has been established
in period n. As the only alteration is a reduction in Qsn by the amount of the sanctions, it
is immediate that if player p is willing and able to supplement player s’s status quo payoffs
to counteract sanctions, then player s’s incentives to play Status Quo are not disturbed. As
in Proposition 1, it is not necessary that the patron make these payments immediately if
player s’s utility from playing Status Quo is high enough relative to its other options, but
the degradation of the status quo payoffs will eventually make these payments necessary in
order to sustain a Status Quo equilibrium.
Therefore if sanctions are to disrupt the Status Quo equilibrium and potentially lead
to ceding by the secessionists, it must be that the patron is either not able or not willing
to make the investment required to maintain the status quo under player c’s sanctions
(Condition 1).
Assume then that Condition 1 holds so that the patron makes no investments in the
Status Quo payoffs of player s. We also need the patron to withhold investments toward
encouraging the secessionists to fight. Lemma 4 of Proposition 1 is not sufficient to guarantee this behavior since no investments are being made in the Status Quo. In addition, the
reference outcome changes: players p and c must now compare their payoffs in the war scenario to the reunification outcome. To be precise, the least stringent condition is m periods
of Status Quo followed by the Reunification outcome, where m is the maximal number of
periods that it takes for the sanctions to degrade the status quo payoffs below the level of
the payoffs from ceding for player s.
Player p’s continuation value when the status quo is played for m − 1 periods before
ceding is 0 +

δm
p
1−de p α,

whereas the continuation value from war is

p2s ). For player c, it is 0 +

δm
p
1−de p β

versus

νp1s + βp2s
1− δ p

λp1s +αp2s
1− δ p

δ

+ 1−pδp α(1 − p1s −

δ

+ 1−pδp β(1 − p1s − p2s ). Thus the condition

for p’s willingness to instigate fighting to outweigh c’s willingness to deter fighting is
λp1s +αp2s
1− δ p

−

δp α
1−δp ( p1s

+ p2s ) + α ∑im=−11 δip >

νp1s + βp2s
1−δc

−

δc β
1−δc ( p1s

+ p2s ) + β ∑im=−11 δci

If this condition holds, then there will be no investments following sanctions. But it
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is still not guaranteed that the secessionists will choose to cede. Status Quo is no longer
a long-run equilibrium strategy, but even without outside investments, it is possible that
Fight could be a more attractive action than Cede. Degrading the status quo payoffs is not
sufficient to make the continuation value from Cede the highest available.
To see why, note that the sanctions only have a partial effect in reducing the Fight
continuation value through the war lottery, while their entire impact is felt on the Status
Quo continuation value. Thus the gap between the Status Quo and Fight continuation
values narrows at the same time as the corresponding gap between the Status Quo and
Cede continuation values. Although the former gap narrows more slowly, it is likely to be
smaller at the outset so sanctions do not necessarily make Cede the most preferred action
for player s.
Therefore, in order to avoid conflict, sanctions must cause player s’s continuation value
from playing Status Quo to fall below its continuation value from playing Cede before it
falls below the continuation value from playing Fight.

40



